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POMEGRANATE JUICE CAN DO THAT? NAVIGATING THE
JURISDICTIONAL LANDSCAPE OF FOOD HEALTH CLAIM
REGULATION IN A POST-POM WONDERFUL WORLD
HILARY G. BUTTRICK*
COURTNEY DROMS HATCH**
INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, the most the consumer expected out of his or her morning
glass of juice was a little extra vitamin C. By 2010, the consumer expected a lot
more. POM Wonderful’s pomegranate juice, for instance, promised to improve
cardiovascular health, treat erectile dysfunction, and combat prostate cancer.1
Those claims made orange juice look a little pathetic. Of course, those wild
promises also landed POM Wonderful in hot water with the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) for misleading the public with scientifically
unsubstantiated health claims.2
POM Wonderful, like many food manufacturers, sought to capitalize on the
American consumers’ quest for the panacea: the magic-bullet food product.  The3
number of health claims made by food producers has skyrocketed in recent
years.  Whether the consumer can rely on these claims as true and scientifically4
* Hilary G. Buttrick, J.D., is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at Butler University.
** Courtney Droms Hatch, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Marketing at Butler
University.
1. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 777 F.3d 478, 484-88 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
2. Id. at 488.
3. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, A Comprehensive Strategy to Overhaul FDA Authority for
Misleading Food Labels, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 617, 621 (2013) (“Consumers are in fact increasingly
seeking healthier foods, so it is not surprising that sales of new products with such claims are higher
than those without them.”). 
4. See Nicole E. Negowetti, Food Labeling Litigation: Exposing Gaps in the FDA’s
Resources and Regulatory Authority, GOVERNANCE STUD. BROOKINGS INST. 5-6 (2014), available
at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/06/26-food-labeling-litigation-fda-negowetti
[http://perma.cc/R4FM-JMMN] (noting that consumer demand for healthier food has increased
markedly in recent years); see also Alexandra Ledyard, Snake Oil in Your Pomegranate Juice:
Food Health Claims and the FTC, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 783, 784 (2013) (“In order to capitalize on
this trend of health-conscious consumerism, advertisers have begun aggressively touting their
http://dx.doi.org/10.18060/4806.0068
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supported is an open question. Although federal administrative agencies such as
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and the FTC have authority to police
health claims on product labels and in product advertising, these agencies lack
the resources to do so fully.  Lanham Act claims and consumer state law claims5
can fill this regulatory void,  but these lawsuits are often met with the affirmative6
defenses of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction—doctrines that, if
successful, take claims out of the hands of private parties and place them back
in the lap of the FDA, an agency that cannot pursue every scientifically shaky
health claim.  Moreover, the preclusion and primary jurisdiction doctrines create7
interagency jurisdictional questions between the FDA and the FTC—the two
agencies expressly authorized to regulate food health claims.   8
Even where courts decline to apply these jurisdictional doctrines, parties
spend an inordinate amount of time addressing them in pretrial motions, thereby
delaying resolution on the merits.  The uneven system of federal enforcement,9
coupled with the vexing jurisdictional objections posed by defendants in
opposition to both private litigation and FTC enforcement actions, leads to a
tortured and woefully inefficient system of food health claim regulation.  The10
solution is to remove the jurisdictional barriers to private lawsuits where
plaintiffs seek to enforce the federal food labeling requirements by eliminating
the express preemption provision in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
(“NLEA”)  and creating a private right of action for NLEA violations. In11
addition, Congress should clarify the respective obligations of the FDA and the
FTC with regard to food health claims on labels and advertisements, which
products’ alleged health benefits.”). 
5. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Varieties and Limits of Transparency in U.S. Food Law, 70
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 11, 14 (2015) (“Resource limits at federal agencies charged with regulating food
hollow out enforcement programs aimed at false or misleading representations.”). 
6. Id. at 12-14.
7. See, e.g., Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, No. 14-cv-
585, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67187, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015) (“SPD moved to dismiss
C&D's Complaint and opposed C&D's motion for a preliminary injunction primarily by asserting
a preclusion defense.”). 
8. See generally Peter E. Masaitis & Evan W. Woolley, Enforcement of FDA Qualified
Health Claims: Who's on the Case?, INSIDE COUNS. (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/
2015/01/09/enforcement-of-fda-qualified-health-claims-whos-on [http://perma.cc/4Y8V-HPVH];
see also Diana R. H. Winters, The Magical Thinking of Food Labeling: The NLEA as a Failed
Statute, 89 TUL. L. REV. 815, 846-56 (2015) (discussing the defenses of preemption and primary
jurisdiction in the context of food labeling litigation).
9. See id. at 849 (“The determination of whether petitioners’ claims are preempted in food
labeling cases takes an enormous amount of resources--those of the parties litigating the claim and
the judiciary. The express preemption provisions of the NLEA and the interaction between the
NLEA’s requirements and the balance of the FDCA are complex and difficult to parse.”). 
10. Id. at 836. 
11. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)).
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would allow better coordination of agency enforcement. 
Part I of this Article discusses the legal pressure points that bear on food
health claims on labels and in advertisements, from both a federal regulatory
standpoint and a private enforcement standpoint. Part II discusses the doctrines
of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.  This12
section explains how these doctrines create jurisdictional hurdles for private
parties—and even the FTC—when they challenge health representations on food
labels. In particular, Part II discusses the recently filed case of Federal Trade
Commission v. Gerber Products Co.,  in which the preclusion and primary13
jurisdiction doctrines were raised in an effort to thwart the FTC’s authority to
challenge health claims that have been regulated—at least in part—by the FDA.14
Part III of this Article analyzes these jurisdictional doctrines and makes policy
recommendations regarding the appropriate balance between federal regulation,
private litigation, and interagency enforcement efforts with regard to food health
claims. The Article concludes with industry guidance.
I. REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT FOOD AND HEALTH: REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Representations about the health benefits of a food are regulated in two
ways.  First, there is an extensive federal regulatory scheme applicable to food15
labels and advertisements.  Food labels must comply with the requirements set16
forth by the FDA.  Representations made in advertisements and promotional17
materials are subject to enforcement actions by the FTC.  Second, there is18
potential civil liability arising from private litigation involving misleading health
claims.  In particular, competitors may pursue Lanham Act claims if they have19
been injured due to the defendant manufacturer’s misrepresentations.20
Additionally, individual consumers may challenge food-related
misrepresentations under state consumer protection statutes or any other number
of state law causes of action; the number of these cases has increased in recent
years.  Each of these forces bears on manufacturer conduct and is discussed in21
12. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).  
13. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Gerber Products Co., No. 2:14-cv-06771-SRC-CLW (D. N.J. Oct. 29, 2014) [hereinafter
Complaint].
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. Memorandum of Understanding Between The Federal Trade Commission and The Food
and Drug Administration, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ¶ 9,850.01 (1971), available at http://www.
fda.gov/aboutFDA/partnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstandingMOUs/domesticmo
us/ucm115791.htm [http://perma.cc/AU3H-PWUV] [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding]. 
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
17. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
18. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
19. See Heinzerling, supra note 5, at 14.
20. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
21. See discussion infra Part I.B.2; see also Winters, supra note 8, at 818 (noting that since
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more detail below.
A. Federal Regulation
For well over fifty years, the FDA and the FTC have shared enforcement
authority with regard to the misbranding of food.  Pursuant to an agreement22
between the agencies, the FDA has “primary responsibility for preventing
misbranding of foods . . . [and] will exercise primary jurisdiction over all matters
regulating the labeling of foods.”  The FTC, on the other hand, has “primary23
responsibility with respect to the regulation of the truth or falsity of all
advertising (other than labeling) of foods.”  The agencies also agree to engage24
in liaison activities where “[t]he same, or similar claims are found in both
labeling and advertising.”  Thus, the FDA and the FTC have traditionally25
divided labor with regard to representations about food and health as follows: the
FDA handles claims on labels; the FTC handles claims in advertising.   26
1. Food Drug and Cosmetics Act and NLEA.—The Food Drug and Cosmetics
Act (“FDCA”)  is a federal statute that, among other purposes, prohibits the27
misbranding of food.  It was passed in 1938 with the goal of ensuring the health28
and safety of the consuming public with regard to food, beverages, drugs, and
cosmetics.  A food or beverage is misbranded if its label is false or misleading,29
if the required label information is not “prominently” displayed,  or if the label30
does not feature the “common or usual name of the food [or beverage].”  In31
1990, Congress passed the NLEA, a comprehensive food-labeling regime.  Not32
only did the NLEA give consumers the now-familiar “nutrition facts” panels  on33
food packaging, but it also authorized the FDA to regulate other aspects of food
labels, such as claims regarding the health benefits or nutritional value of the
product.34
1990, the amount of litigation involving food labeling has increased).
22. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 15, at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Ledyard, supra note 4, at 791.
27. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
28. See Stephen J. White, Jr., Note, How Far Does the Apple (Pomegranate) Fall from the
Tree? Preclusion of Lanham Act Claims by the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act and POM Wonderful
LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 262, 269 (2015) (“The main
goals of the FDCA remained consistent, one of which is to protect the public from the misbranding
of food . . . .”). 
29. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 343(f) (2012).
31. Id. § 343(I); see also Pomeranz, supra note 3, at 620.  
32. See 21 U.S.C. § 343; see also Winters, supra note 8, at 820-27 (discussing the history of
the NLEA).
33. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.2 (2015). 
34. Id. § 101.14.  
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In particular, the FDA regulates three types of claims under the NLEA:
nutrient content claims, structure/function claims, and health claims.  A nutrient35
content claim “characterizes the level of a nutrient in the food (e.g., ‘low fat,’
‘high in oat bran,’ or ‘contains 100 calories’).”  A manufacturer may assert only36
those nutrient content claims that have been approved by the FDA.37
Structure/function claims, on the other hand, do not have to be approved by the
FDA prior to use on a product label so long as they are “truthful and not
misleading.”  These claims “focus on effects derived from nutritive value” in the38
food.  For example, a food product’s assertion that “calcium builds strong39
bones” is a structure/function claim.    40
The third category of claims regulated by the FDA is health claims, which
assert that the risk of a disease or health condition is lessened by a substance in
the product.  For example, the FDA has approved the following health claim41
describing the relationship between calcium and osteoporosis: “Calcium and
Osteoporosis: Adequate calcium throughout life, as part of a well-balanced diet,
may reduce the risk of osteoporosis.”  FDA approval is required for all health42
claims on food labels.  It is important to note that health claims can only assert43
a reduced risk of disease;  a claim that asserts a connection between44
consumption of the food and the “cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease” results in the food being treated as a drug under the FDCA and thus
subjects the food to the FDA’s regulations regarding drug labeling.45
A health claim can either be “authorized,” which requires a showing that the
claim is supported by “significant scientific agreement,”  or it can be46
“qualified,” which requires a lesser showing of “credible” evidence.  To satisfy47
35. Id.; see also Ellen A. Black, Keep Out the FDA: Food Manufacturers’ Ability to
Effectively Self-Regulate Front-of-Package Food Labeling, 17 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 4
(2015) (discussing the difference between nutrient content claims, structure/function claims, and
health claims).
36. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A FOOD
LABELING GUIDE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 72 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/UCM265446.pdf [http://perma.cc/J4KJ-M2R5] [hereinafter
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION].
37. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b).   
38. See Structure/Function Claims, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/
IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutri tion/ucm2006881.htm#conventional
[http://perma.cc/6Y5C-295G] (last updated Dec. 23, 2014).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(1).
42. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 36, at App. C.
43. Id. at 80.
44. Id.
45. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012).
46. Id. §§ 101.14(c), 343(r)(3)(B)(i).
47. See Guidance for Industry: Evidence-Based Review System for the Scientific Evaluation
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the “significant scientific agreement” standard, the manufacturer must show that
“based on the totality of publicly available scientific evidence . . . there is
significant scientific agreement, among experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such
evidence.”  In evaluating whether the significant scientific agreement standard48
is met, the FDA considers the number of studies relevant to the claim, the
methodological quality of those studies, the studies’ outcomes, the degree to
which those outcomes are consistent, and the relevance to the U.S. population.49
While conclusive evidence is not required, the FDA will generally approve the
health claim only if there appears to be near-consensus in the scientific
community regarding the validity of the claim.  Historically, the significant50
scientific agreement standard has been hard to satisfy.  To date, the FDA has51
recognized only eighteen authorized health claims.  Qualified health claims52
arose as a result of the FDA’s reluctance to authorize health claims under the
significant scientific agreement standard.  In the 1999 D.C. Circuit Court of53
Appeals opinion Pearson v. Shalala, the court found that where the scientific
uncertainty surrounding a health claim could be mitigated by a disclaimer, the
FDA’s outright refusal to authorize the health claim violated the manufacturer’s
First Amendment commercial speech rights.  In response to the court’s order54
requiring the FDA to clarify the significant scientific agreement standard, the
FDA ultimately created qualified health claims, which allow manufacturers to
make health claims if they are supported by “credible evidence.”  The credible55
evidence standard is ill defined, but it is less stringent than the significant
scientific agreement standard.  Health claims supported by credible evidence56
must be “qualified” by an appropriate disclaimer that includes “language that
identifies limits to the level of scientific evidence to support the relationship.”57
The process for obtaining FDA approval of a health claim or permission for
a qualified health claim begins with a petition filed by the manufacturer.  If the58
FDA determines that the health claim meets the significant scientific agreement
of Health Claims—Final, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2009), http://www.fda.gov/Food/Guidance
Regulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm073332.htm
[http://perma.cc/7UGL-CSRK] [hereinafter Guidance for Industry].
48. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c).  
49. See Guidance for Industry, supra note 47.  
50. Id.
51. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 36, at App. C.
52. Id. 
53. Masaitis & Woolley, supra note 8.
54. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
55. See Guidance for Industry, supra note 47.
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (2013), http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/
ucm111447.htm [http://perma.cc/WZ7A-ZDT6].
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standard, the FDA authorizes the claim through issuance of a rule.  A health59
claim that fails to meet the significant scientific agreement standard will not be
approved.  If, however, the FDA finds that the health claim is nonetheless60
supported by credible evidence, the FDA may issue a letter to the manufacturer
outlining the circumstances under which the FDA may refrain from enforcement
activity pursuant to its discretion.  Such a letter also informs the manufacturer61
of the disclaiming language that must appear on the label.  If the FDA62
determines that the claim is not supported by either the significant scientific
agreement standard or the credible evidence standard, the FDA will deny the
petition.  A manufacturer that makes false or misleading representations63
regarding health claims has engaged in “misbranding” in violation of the
FDCA.   64
The FDA engages in comparatively little food health claim enforcement
activity in light of the staggering number of products it is expected to regulate.65
The FDA is burdened with regulating eighty percent of the United States’ food
supply.  Although the FDA has authority to issue injunctions and impose66
monetary penalties, the FDA is authorized to do so only when it appears that a
serious safety concern is at issue; misleading health claims on food products do
not rise to this level.  Instead, the agency’s primary enforcement mechanism is67
the issuance of warning letters that request that the manufacturer voluntarily
correct its behavior.  The efficacy of these letters is in serious doubt.  As noted68 69
by Lisa Heinzerling, “[a] recent FDA oversight initiative on food labeling
involved a mere seventeen warning letters. It is not clear that even these few
letters sparked compliance from the relevant companies.”  The bulk of the70
FDA’s regulatory activities target drugs, medical devices, and
cigarettes —products that have a greater potential to harm consumers physically71
than food. It is not surprising then that the FDA’s enforcement of its food
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (2012).
65. See Black, supra note 35, at 11 (“As the agency tasked with so many diverse and wide-
ranging areas, the FDA has a reputation for being overworked, underfunded, and incapable of
effectively governing its responsibilities.”); see also Negowetti, supra note 4, at 3 (“Although the
FDA is responsible for enforcing labeling regulations, it lacks the enforcement authority to
effectively deter food companies from making misleading claims.”). 
66. See Negowetti, supra note 4, at 2. The U.S. Department of Agriculture regulates the
remaining food products, including meat, eggs, and poultry. Id.
67. See id. at 3-4.
68. See id. at 3.
69. Heinzerling, supra note 5, at 15.
70. Id.
71. See Black, supra note 35, at 11.
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labeling guidelines gets put on the back burner.  
Commentators have been sharply critical of the FDA’s ability to regulate
food labeling given its lack of resources compared to the volume of products it
must oversee.  These concerns are deepened by the fact that the FDA’s policies72
and priorities are subject to change with the political climate, often at the expense
of the consumer:
Such subjectivity leads to inconsistent, capricious decisions at the whim
of whichever political party is in power. The consumer, who likely lacks
knowledge of the agency’s arbitrariness, endures the consequences of the
FDA’s lack of perpetual lucidity and is bound by regulations that may or
may not reflect the consumer’s true desires.73
Nor can the consumer easily take matters into his or her own hands when a
manufacturer fails to conform to the FDA’s labeling requirements, as there is no
private right of action to enforce the NLEA.   74
2. Federal Trade Commission Act.—While the FDCA and the NLEA deal
primarily with product labeling, the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)
addresses product advertising.  The purpose of the FTC Act is to protect75
consumers from false and misleading advertisements and business practices.76
This statute delegates authority to the FTC to promulgate rules and issue
guidance regarding acts that constitute deceptive practices.  In the context of77
deceptive advertising, the FTC considers the content of the advertisement,
whether the representations made are “false, misleading or unsubstantiated,” and
whether a consumer would find those representations to be material in deciding
whether to purchase the product.   78
Unlike the FDA’s preapproval process for health claims on food labels, the
FTC does not preapprove health claims in advertisements; rather, the FTC
regulates unsubstantiated claims through enforcement actions.  The level of79
scientific substantiation the FTC requires is similar to, but not precisely the same
as, the level of evidence required by the FDA in its preapproval process.  While80
the NLEA requires the FDA to follow the significant scientific agreement
72. See, e.g., id. at 12 (“These deficiencies elucidate the public’s well-founded perspicacity
that the FDA is overburdened and incapable of effectively regulating yet another matter.”). 
73. Id. at 12-13.
74. 21 U.S.C. § 337 (2012); see also POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct.
2228, 2235 (2014).  
75. See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (2011)).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
77. Id. 
78. POM Wonderful, LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 777 F.3d 478, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2015).   
79. See Ledyard, supra note 4, at 792.  
80. See Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (May
13, 1994), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1994/05/enforcement-policy-statement-food-
advertising [http://perma.cc/K99J-EZ8F] [hereinafter FTC Enforcement Statement].
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standard, the FTC follows a “competent and reliable scientific evidence”
standard.  The FTC has defined the competent and reliable scientific evidence81
standard to mean “tests, analyses, research, studies, or other evidence based on
the expertise of professionals in the relevant area, that have been conducted and
evaluated in an objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures
generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable results.”82
In an action challenging a manufacturer’s health claims, the FTC begins by
determining whether the advertisement is making “efficacy claims” or
“establishment claims.”  The level of substantiation required for a health claim83
depends on this categorization.  Efficacy claims do not purport to be84
scientifically established; rather, they simply suggest “that a product successfully
performs the advertised function or yields the advertised benefit.”  An advertiser85
making an efficacy claim need only show that it possessed a “reasonable basis”
for the assertion.  To evaluate whether such a reasonable basis exists, the FTC86
considers several factors, including the type of product and claim, the benefits
of a truthful claim, the consequences of a false claim, “the ease of developing
substantiation for the claim,” and, “the amount of substantiation experts in the
field would consider reasonable.”  Establishment claims, on the other hand,87
suggest, “that a product’s effectiveness or superiority has been scientifically
established.”  A higher level of scientific substantiation is required for88
establishment claims.  If the claim makes a “specific” reference to a particular89
type of substantiation, then the advertiser must be able to produce that type of
substantiation.  “Non-specific” claims, such as a representation that the claim90
is “medically proven,” must be supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the
relevant scientific community that the claim is true.  91
The level of scientific substantiation required to support health claims in
advertisements received significant analysis by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
in the recent case of POM Wonderful, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission.  In92
that case, the FTC alleged that POM Wonderful misled consumers in a series of
advertisements purportedly supported by over $35 million in research and over
100 studies.  POM Wonderful represented consumption of its pomegranate juice93
81. Id.
82. Id. 
83. POM Wonderful, 777 F.3d at 490.   
84. See id.
85. Id.  
86. Id.
87. Id. at 490-91 (quoting In re Daniel Chapter One, No. 9329, 2009 FTC LEXIS 259, at *25
(U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n Dec. 24, 2009)).
88. Id. at 490.
89. See id. at 491.
90. Id. 
91. Id.
92. See id. at 478-505.   
93. Id. at 484.
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could improve cardiovascular health, treat prostate cancer, and treat erectile
dysfunction.  In making these representations, POM Wonderful referenced94
scientific studies that supported its position, but it failed to disclose to consumers
that in many instances, the studies were based on small sample sizes and
numerous other studies found no link between consumption of pomegranate juice
and the aforementioned health conditions.  The FTC sanctioned POM95
Wonderful for this conduct in a three-part order, which drew a distinction
between the level of substantiation required for “disease treatment” claims and
the level of substantiation required for “general health benefit” claims.  Part I96
of the FTC’s order dealt with POM Wonderful’s disease treatment claims and
mandated that POM Wonderful support any such unqualified claim with “at least
two randomized and controlled human clinical trials (RCTs).”  For the purposes97
of the order, the FTC defined unqualified health claims as any representation
regarding the disease treatment properties of POM Wonderful’s juice that was
not accompanied by an unambiguous disclaimer.  Part II of the FTC’s order98
prohibited POM Wonderful from “misrepresenting the results of scientific
studies in their ads.”  Part III of the FTC’s order prohibited POM Wonderful99
from making any representation about “the general health benefits” of its
products unless those claims were supported by “competent and reliable
evidence.”  The FTC did not require POM Wonderful to support general health100
claims with RCTs, but it did impose a level of substantiation that required the
existence of accurate and reliable studies that are generally accepted by others
in the field.   101
On review, the D.C. Circuit agreed with many of the FTC’s findings
regarding the deceptive nature of POM Wonderful’s health claims  and the102
court left undisturbed Parts II and III of the FTC’s order.  The court instead103
focused on Part I of the FTC’s order,  which required POM Wonderful to104
support its unqualified disease treatment claims with two RCTs.  The court105
affirmed the FTC’s finding that the scientific community would require some
type of clinical trial to substantiate POM’s unqualified disease treatment claims,
94. Id. at 483.
95. Id. at 484-88.
96. Id. at 488-89.
97. Id. at 489.   
98. Id. at 501.
99. Id. at 489.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 500.
102. Id. at 498. The court affirmed the FTC’s finding that the bulk of the representations at
issue were deceptive because they were not adequately substantiated under either the scientific
standard for establishment claims or the reasonable basis test for efficacy clams. Id.
103. Id. at 505.  
104. Id.
105. Id. at 489.
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but the court took issue with the FTC’s decision to require two RCTs.  The two-106
RCT requirement was overly broad and could deny the public access to valuable
information about a food product’s potential health benefits.  Thus, the court107
ruled that POM Wonderful’s unqualified disease treatment claims need only be
supported by one RCT.   108
POM Wonderful, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission provides important
guidance regarding the FTC’s substantiation expectations for food health claims
in advertisements. The FTC can require manufacturers to come forward with an
RCT to support unqualified disease-treatment claims.  General health claims,109
however, may not be subject to a mandatory RCT requirement; thus, other forms
of “competent and reliable scientific evidence” may suffice to support such a
representation.  Although the trend with FTC enforcement actions in recent110
years has been to require more scientific substantiation of health claims,  the111
FTC does not have the resources to litigate every case with the same vigor with
which it pursued POM Wonderful.  Thus, the FTC is increasingly relying on112
warning letters and consent orders to secure manufacturers’ voluntary
compliance.  It is important to note that the FTC has exclusive authority to113
enforce its rules; thus, neither a consumer nor a competitor may bring a private
cause of action under the FTC Act.  114
3. FDA/FTC Regulatory Overlap.—At times, both the FDA and the FTC
have jurisdiction to regulate the same food health claim. For instance, the FTC
106. Id. at 505.
107. Id. at 502-03. Because the FTC narrowly defined an “unqualified” health claim as any
representation without an unambiguous disclaimer stating that the evidence is “inconclusive” or that
“additional research is necessary,” a disclaimer using the words “preliminary” or “initial” would
be prohibited unless it were supported by two RCTs. Thus, even a health claim supported by one
RCT and characterized as “preliminary” would be insufficient. Accordingly, the public could be
denied access to a health claim that was supported by the “gold standard” of research: one RCT.
The court found that the FTC failed to demonstrate that the requirement of a second RCT would
yield enough benefit to overcome this hurdle. Id.
108. Id. at 505.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Eric Berman, FTC Orders in Health-Related Advertising Cases: From A New
Approach to the New Normal, 29 ANTITRUST 98, 101 (2015); see also Ledyard, supra note 4, at
794-95 (noting recent FTC trend to rely on consent orders to “leverage” companies into “greater
compliance”).
112. See Ledyard, supra note 4, at 794.
113. See id. (“While the FTC and FDA have the enforcement power to stop false and
misleading claims, both agencies are subjected to continuous budget pressure, and in practice, only
the most egregious offenders are addressed. For this reason, the FTC is seeking voluntary consent
agreements from offending businesses through consent orders.”). 
114. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Black,
supra note 35, at 25 (“[T]here is no private right of action based upon an alleged violation of the
FTC Act.”). 
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may pursue a manufacturer that uses a nutrient content claim in an advertisement
in a manner that is “inconsistent with FDA’s definitions.”  In addition, the FTC115
may be faced with a health claim in an advertisement that is also subject to the
FDA’s petition process for an authorized or qualified health claim.  Under these116
circumstances, the FTC generally defers to the FDA’s determination of scientific
substantiation for the health claim.  Qualified health claims, however, are a117
different matter. The FTC recognizes that there may be circumstances where a
producer does not have FDA approval to make a qualified health claim on a food
label, but the manufacturer may nonetheless be able to make such a
representation in an advertisement under the FTC’s “competent and reliable
scientific evidence” standard.  Where the FDA has not acted, the FTC will118
make its own determination regarding the adequacy of the scientific support for
the claim and its accompanying disclaimer.  The FTC claims that it closely119
monitors qualified health claims in advertisements to ensure their reliability:
The Commission will therefore be especially vigilant in examining
whether qualified claims are presented in a manner that ensures that
consumers understand both the extent of the support for the claim and
the existence of any significant contrary view within the scientific
community. In the absence of adequate qualification, the Commission
will find such claims deceptive.120
Thus, the FTC will generally defer to the FDA where the FDA has affirmatively
recognized a health claim, qualified health claim, or nutrient content claim, but
in the absence of such FDA action, the FTC will engage in its own analysis to
assess the claim’s validity.  121
115. See FTC Enforcement Statement, supra note 80.
116. Id.; see also Ledyard, supra note 4, at 791.
117. See FTC Enforcement Statement, supra note 80 (“The Commission regards the
‘significant scientific agreement’ standard, as set forth in the NLEA and FDA’s regulations, to be
the principal guide to what experts in the field of diet-disease relationships would consider
reasonable substantiation for an unqualified health claim. Thus, it is likely that the Commission will
reach the same conclusion as FDA as to whether an unqualified claim about the relationship
between a nutrient or substance in a food and a disease or health-related condition is adequately
supported by the scientific evidence.”). 
118. Id. (“While the Commission’s approach to evaluation of unqualified health claims will
generally parallel FDA’s assessment of whether there is significant scientific agreement supporting
the relevant diet-disease relationship, the Commission recognizes that there may be certain limited
instances in which carefully [crafted] qualified health claims may be permitted under Section 5
although not yet authorized by the FDA, if the claims are expressly qualified to convey clearly and
fully the extent of the scientific support.”). 
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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B. Private Litigation
1. Lanham Act.—Although representations about the health benefits of a
food are formally regulated and monitored by the FDA and the FTC, additional
checks on food labeling and advertising exist in the form of private litigation.
Although a private actor cannot sue a product manufacturer for misbranding in
violation of NLEA or deceptive advertising in violation of the FTC Act, the
Lanham Act creates a private cause of action for unfair competition where a
manufacturer makes deceptive, false, or misleading representations about its own
products or a competitor’s products.  To succeed on a Lanham Act claim, the122
plaintiff must prove that: 
(1) The defendant has made false or misleading statements of fact
concerning his own product or another's; (2) the statement actually or
tends to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; (3) the
statement is material in that it will likely influence the deceived
consumer's purchasing decisions; (4) the advertisements were introduced
into interstate commerce; and (5) there is some causal link between the
challenged statements and harm to the plaintiff.123
The private cause of action under the Lanham Act extends only to competitors,
however, not to individual consumers.  Thus, consumers cannot sue124
manufacturers for violations of the Lanham Act.  Instead, consumers who want125
to pursue manufacturers for misleading food health claims must do so under state
law theories.   126
2. Consumer Actions Under State Law.—The only remedy open to
consumers—the end users who actually purchase, ingest, and stand to be harmed
by these products—is a grab-bag of state law claims.  Some states have127
consumer protection statutes, unfair trade practices statutes, or causes of action
for false advertising.  Consumers may also bring breach of warranty or common128
law fraud claims.  Most often, it appears consumer claims are not pursued by129
individuals as the amount at issue is too small to justify litigation.  Instead, such130
cases are generally brought as consumer class actions.131
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012); POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234
(2014).  
123. Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 1999). 
124. POM Wonderful LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 2234.
125. Id.
126. See Winters, supra note 8, at 846-48.
127. Id.
128. Negowetti, supra note 4, at 11.
129. Id.
130. See Shea Thompson, Artificially “Natural”: Class Action Lawsuits Attack Misleading
“Natural” Claims in FDA’s Absence, 47 IND. L. REV. 893, 898 (2014).
131. See id. (“The majority of these lawsuits are punitive class action lawsuits brought by
plaintiff lawyers, representing the class members.”). 
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II. JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
Food health claims are thus shaped by competing forces: regulation by the
FDA on product labels; enforcement actions by the FTC for unsubstantiated
representations in advertisements; private lawsuits from competitors who claim
that misrepresentations regarding a product’s health benefits interfere with the
market; and private lawsuits from consumers who claim that they were induced
to purchase products they otherwise would have passed in the grocery aisle.
Although each of these forces does, in theory, incentivize food producers to be
honest about their products, they are also the source of jurisdictional confusion
when they converge over the same representation.  
First, defendants commonly raise jurisdictional defenses where the food
health claim is subject to both regulation by the FDA and lawsuits from private
actors.  The answer to this public-versus-private enforcement question132
frequently turns on the doctrines of preclusion, preemption, and primary
jurisdiction.  Second, interagency jurisdictional issues arise between the FDA133
and the FTC with regard to policing food health claims.  Claims on food labels,134
which are traditionally regulated by the FDA, may substantively overlap with
claims in advertisements, which are traditionally regulated by the FTC.  This135
precise issue is before a federal district court in New Jersey in the case of
Federal Trade Commission v. Gerber Products Co.  Which agency should be136
on point in this case? The doctrines of preclusion and primary jurisdiction bear
on this question as well.  
A. Preclusion, Preemption, Primary Jurisdiction, and the Private Litigation
of Food Health Representations
1. Preclusion.—The preclusion doctrine addresses the interplay between
federal laws.  The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that one piece of federal137
legislation does not interfere with or frustrate the purpose of another federal
statute.  Where two federal statutes regulate the same conduct, courts often look138
to the preemption doctrine for guidance because “its principles are instructive
132. See Winters, supra note 8, at 848-57 (discussing the defenses of preemption and primary
jurisdiction in the context of food labeling litigation).
133. Id.
134. See Masaitis & Woolley, supra note 8 (discussing application of preclusion and primary
jurisdiction doctrines to an FTC lawsuit challenging a manufacturer’s representations about a FDA-
regulated qualified health claim).  
135. See Chelsea M. Childs, Federal Regulation of the “Smart Choices Program”: Subjecting
Front-of-Package Nutrition Labeling Schemes to Concurrent Regulation by the FDA and the FTC,
90 B.U. L. REV. 2403, 2404 (2010) (“In today’s world of mass marketing, however, labeling and
advertising often overlap.”). 
136. See discussion infra Part II.B.  
137. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236 (2014).
138. See generally id. (discussing similarities between preclusion and preemption doctrines).
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insofar as they are designed to assess the interaction of laws that bear on the
same subject.”  In evaluating whether to apply the preclusion doctrine, courts139
consider the existence of an express provision in the statute that creates a
preclusive effect  and whether the two federal statutes complement each140
other.  If the court determines that the two statutes cannot be applied141
simultaneously, the court will determine which statute should be given preclusive
effect.142
In the context of FDA-regulated products, defendant manufacturers
commonly raise the preclusion doctrine as a defense to Lanham Act claims.143
Essentially, the defense argument is that the product has been regulated by the
FDA; thus, any private Lanham Act suit interferes with FDA regulation and
should thus be precluded.  Until 2014, it was an open question whether a144
business could sue a competitor for unfair competition based on a competitor’s
product label that was also subject to regulation by the FDA.  The Supreme145
Court answered that question in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.  In that146
case, POM Wonderful made a pomegranate-blueberry juice blend.  Coca-Cola’s147
Minute Maid brand began marketing and selling a “pomegranate-blueberry” juice
blend, which was, in fact, only .3% pomegranate juice and .2% blueberry juice.148
The rest of Minute Maid’s product was a mixture of apple, grape, and raspberry
juice.  POM Wonderful sued Coca-Cola under the Lanham Act alleging that149
Minute Maid’s labeling of the product, which touted its pomegranate-blueberry
components, was misleading.  Thus, POM Wonderful argued, consumers were150
tricked into buying the less expensive Minute Maid product, which caused POM
Wonderful to lose sales.  Coca-Cola invoked the preclusion doctrine and argued151
that its product label was exclusively regulated by the FDA; thus, to the extent
its juice label was misleading, only the FDA had authority to raise the issue—not
a competitor.152
The Court found that although the Minute Maid beverage label was regulated
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2237.
141. Id. at 2238.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Church & Dwight Co v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, No. 14-cv-
585, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67187, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015). 
144. Id.
145. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2236. The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to consider
whether a private party may bring a Lanham Act claim challenging a food label that is regulated by
the FDCA.” Id. 
146. Id. at 2237. 
147. Id. at 2233.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2235.
150. Id. at 2233.
151. Id. at 2235.
152. Id. at 2239. 
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by the FDA, POM Wonderful’s Lanham Act claim was not precluded.  The153
Court found no textual support in either the FDCA or the Lanham Act that
suggested that Congress intended to prohibit Lanham Act claims involving
beverage labels.  Moreover, the Court noted that both statutes had been154
amended at various points and that the FDCA expressly preempts some state law
claims—if Congress wanted to preclude Lanham Act claims under these
circumstances, it certainly could have done so.  In addition, the statutes155
complement each other in that they both regulate food labeling with the goal of
protecting the integrity of the marketplace, but they approach this goal from
different angles.  The Court rejected the notion that the FDCA’s labeling156
requirements are a ceiling with regard to regulation.  Although ensuring157
compliance with the labeling guidelines is one method of curbing industry
misrepresentations, it is not the exclusive method.  The Court reasoned that158
Congress could have intended to place additional pressure on producers when it
created a private cause of action in the Lanham Act.  Because competitors in159
the same industry have “detailed knowledge regarding how consumers rely upon
certain sales and marketing strategies,” they may be much better at ferreting out
potentially misleading product labels than the FDA.  The Court found that160
“Lanham Act suits draw upon this market expertise by empowering private
parties to sue competitors to protect their interests on a case-by-case basis.”  In161
addition, it is not feasible for the FDA to bring enforcement actions for all
problematic food and beverage labels.  If competitors were precluded from162
bringing Lanham Act suits, manufacturers in industries receiving less attention
from the FDA could misbrand their products with impunity, which in turn could
harm consumers.  Thus, the Court concluded that POM Wonderful’s Lanham163
Act claim could proceed, even though the Minute Maid juice label was subject
to regulation by the FDA164
Several lower court decisions after POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.
discussed the preclusion doctrine in the context of other FDA-regulated
products.  Not surprisingly, most of these decisions reflect a reluctance to apply165
the preclusion doctrine and have thus extended the holding in POM Wonderful
153. Id. at 2241.
154. Id. at 2237.
155. Id. at 2238.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2240.
158. Id. at 2238.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2239.
163. Id.  
164. Id. at 2241.
165. See, e.g., Church & Dwight Co v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, No. 14-cv-
585, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67187, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015).
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LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. beyond the food labeling context and into the drug and
device context.  For example, in Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Precision166
Diagnostics, GmbH,  the district court held that the preclusion doctrine did not167
bar a competitor’s Lanham Act claim, despite the fact that the medical device at
issue went through an extensive FDA approval process.  First, the court168
recognized the absence of an express provision in the FDCA precluding
competing claims.  Second, the court focused on the resource constraints of the169
FDA and the public policy benefits of treating FDA regulation as the floor, rather
than the ceiling, of acceptable manufacturer conduct.  Lanham Act claims can170
supplement FDA regulation, thereby ensuring a fairer, more honest
marketplace.  Thus, the court concluded that FDA approval of the product was171
“beside the point” and did not bear on the preclusion issue.  172
Other lower courts have declined to apply the preclusion doctrine where the
Lanham Act claims were based on allegations that the defendant misrepresented
its product as FDA-approved.  For example, the courts in Par Sterile Products,173
LLC v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC  and JHP Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Hospira,174
166. See White, supra note 28, at 283-84 (discussing application of POM Wonderful LLC v.
Coca-Cola Co.’s preclusion holding in lower court decisions).
167. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67187.
168. Id. at *29. This case involved a false advertising claim based on the defendant’s
representations that its pregnancy test could also give the consumer an estimate of the number of
weeks of her pregnancy. Id. at *4. The defendant argued that because the product’s label was
subject to an extensive FDA approval process, the plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim was precluded. Id.
at *5. Although the court agreed that the pregnancy test had been subjected to an extensive FDA
approval process, the court declined to apply the preclusion doctrine. Id. at *29.
169. Id. at *20.
170. Id. at *24-28 (relying on Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578-79 (2009), in finding that
private lawsuits incentivize manufacturers to eliminate safety risks and also serve to compensate
victims of manufacturer misconduct). 
171. Id. at *26.
172. Id. at *25.
173. See, e.g., Innovative Health Solutions, Inc. v. DyAnsys, Inc., No. 14-cv-5207, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 65431, at *22 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2015) (holding that a Lanham Act claim based on
an alleged misrepresentation of FDA approval was not precluded).
174. No. 14-C-3349, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32409, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2015). In
this case, the plaintiff manufactured an injectable vasopressin product, which was FDA-approved.
Id. at *2. The defendant also manufactured a vasopressin injectable, but it was not FDA-approved.
Id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant marketed and otherwise created the impression that its
product was FDA-approved. Id. at *5. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was seeking to
enforce the FDCA through a Lanham Act claim; the court disagreed, finding that “the dispute is of
the sort with which the Lanham Act is concerned to the extent it involves deception of consumers
as to the fact of whether a product carries the imprimatur of FDA approval.” Id. at *11. In addition,
“[a]s long as there is no allegation that [defendant] must do something that directly conflicts with
the FDCA or an FDA regulation, or may not do something that the FDCA or an FDA regulation
specifically requires . . . [plaintiff’s] Lanham Act claim is not precluded by the FDCA.” Id. at *11-
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Inc.,  reached this conclusion in reliance on the POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-175
Cola Co.  decision. The JHP court focused on the public policy benefits of176
allowing Lanham Act claims to augment FDA regulation: 
[FDA approval is] a sort of “Good Housekeeping Seal” for
pharmaceuticals: it is the government’s imprimatur on a product,
indicating quality, safety, and desirability . . . if a product has been
approved, consumers may take some assurance that it has been properly
tested and meets the agency’s minimum quality standards. This makes
an FDA-approved product a more attractive product, whether at the
wholesale, retail, or end user level. But it can also be expensive to get
approval for a drug, so a company that chooses to invest in getting
approval may operate at a competitive disadvantage if other companies
can falsely represent to the public that their unapproved products are
FDA-approved. Thus, representations that a drug is approved when it is
not undermine the Lanham Act’s public policy goals both by confusing
consumers and by enabling unfair competition by producers who have
not bothered to get FDA approval.177
These courts were careful to place limits on their holdings, however, noting
that a competitor cannot use a Lanham Act claim to pursue a private remedy for
violation of the FDCA: “That is, because the FDCA does not contain a private
right of action, claims that require a court to interpret, apply, or enforce the
FDCA remain precluded.”  Lanham Act claims may still be barred by the178
doctrine of preclusion if, for example, those claims conflict with the FDA’s
affirmative policy judgment or if the claims involve litigation of an FDCA
violation.  One post-POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. case, for example,179
found that the preclusion doctrine barred a Lanham Act suit that alleged that the
defendant was required to seek FDA approval for its medical device and it failed
12.  
175. 52 F. Supp. 3d 992 (C.D. Cal. 2014). In this case, the plaintiff manufactured an injectable
epinephrine product and obtained FDA approval for its product under the brand name Adrenalin.
Id. at 996. The defendants also manufactured injectable epinephrine products, but their products
were not FDA-approved. Id. The plaintiff brought a Lanham Act suit alleging, among other claims,
that the defendants’ advertisements misled consumers by representing that their products were
approved by the FDA. Id. The defendants argued that this claim should have been dismissed under
the doctrine of preclusion because drug regulation is within the exclusive authority of the FDA. Id.
at 1001. The court rejected this argument. Id.  
176. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
177. JHP Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.  
178. Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, No. 14-cv-5852015,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67187, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015).
179. JHP Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 998-99.   
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to do so.  In Catheter Connections v. Ivera Medical Corp.,  the plaintiff180 181
alleged that the defendant marketed a medical device as FDA-approved when it
was not.  The defendant had, however, received FDA approval for a previous182
version of the device.  The court determined that the plaintiff’s claim did not183
involve a simple case of misrepresentation; rather, it involved a question of the
defendant’s obligation under the FDCA to seek approval for a newer version of
the device.  The court concluded that it was up to the FDA to determine184
whether new approval was necessary.  Because the plaintiff was, in essence,185
seeking a private remedy for an alleged violation of the FDCA, the claim was
precluded.   186
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. and the lower court decisions relying
on it offer key insights with regard to the doctrine of preclusion. First, simply
because the FDA regulates a product label does not guarantee application of the
preclusion defense; FDA labeling guidelines set the floor, not the ceiling, with
regard to product label regulation.  Second, Lanham Act claims based on a187
manufacturer’s misrepresentation of FDA approval are generally not
precluded.  Third, it is clear that a competitor cannot use a Lanham Act claim188
to pursue a private remedy for violation of the FDCA. 
2. Preemption.—Although the preclusion doctrine deals with the relationship
between potentially conflicting federal statutes, the preemption doctrine focuses
on state law claims that intersect with activities regulated by federal law.  The189
relationship between state law claims, FDA-regulated products, and the
preemption doctrine has been tortured, to say the least.  These issues have been190
180. Catheter Connections v. Ivera Med. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98206, at *16 (D. Utah July 17, 2014).  
181. Id. at *16.
182. Id. at *6.
183. Id. 
184. Id. at *15-16.
185. Id. at *16-17.
186. Id. at *17. The plaintiff’s other claims, which focused on the “substance of [defendant’s]
representations in the context of the medical device market and what drives buyers’ purchasing
decisions,” were not precluded by the FDCA as they dealt with representations in the marketplace
and did not require the court to evaluate FDA policy or speculate about the FDA approval process.
Id. at *19-20. 
187. Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, No. 14-cv-5852015,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67187, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015).
188. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 998-99 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Par
Sterile Prods., LLC v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, No. 14-C-3349, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32409,
at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2015).
189. See generally James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century:
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 967
(2008) (“Preemption is a constitutional doctrine, derived from the Supremacy Clause, of power
sharing between federal, state, and local governments.”). 
190. See generally Claudia L. Andre, What’s in that Guacamole? How Bates and the Power
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addressed by the Supreme Court multiple times in the last fifteen years and lower
courts continue to struggle with the doctrine.191
Preemption in the context of food health claims is no exception. Three types
of preemption have the potential to affect food products regulated by the FDA:
field preemption, conflict preemption, and express preemption.  Field192
preemption arises where federal law has so extensively occupied the “field” that
there is no room for state regulation.  Conflict preemption arises when193
compliance with both the federal and state law is impossible or where the state
law creates an “obstacle” to accomplishment of the federal legislation’s
objectives.  In addition, the NLEA contains an express preemption provision194
that prohibits a state from “directly or indirectly establish[ing] any requirement
for the labeling of food that is not identical to” the labeling requirements imposed
by the FDA.  In this context, 195
“[N]ot identical to” . . . means “that the State requirement directly or
indirectly imposes obligations or contains provisions concerning the
composition or labeling of food, or concerning a food container, that are
not imposed by or contained in the applicable federal regulation or differ
from those specifically imposed by or contained in the applicable federal
regulation.”196
A state may, however, impose labeling requirements that match those imposed
by the FDA and a consumer may bring a state law claim to enforce those
requirements.  In addition, the NLEA “does not preempt any state law unless197
the law is ‘expressly preempted.’”  There is a strong presumption against198
finding preemption in this context, as states are the traditional regulators of
of Preemption Will Affect Litigation Against the Food Industry, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 234
(2007) (“However, some statutes, including the NLEA, do not have a clear, sweeping preemption
provision. The result is a mishmash of conflicting judicial decisions from both state and federal
courts deciding whether or not federal law preempts state law actions.”); see also Marcia Boumil,
FDA Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemption of State Laws for “Parallel” Tort Claims, 18
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 7-12 (2015) (summarizing current law on preemption and the
FDCA).
191. See generally Boumil, supra note 190, at 7-12.
192. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2009).
193. Id. at 336.
194. Id. at 339.
195. Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343-
1(a)(5) (2012)).
196. 21 C.F.R. § 100.1(c)(4) (1993).
197. See Winters, supra note 8, at 832. (“Courts have also interpreted the express preemption
provision to allow for actions to be brought under state laws establishing identical requirements to
the FDCA, rejecting allegations that such actions are really attempts to enforce the FDCA and
thereby circumvent the FDCA’s prohibition on private actions.”). 
198. Reid, 780 F.3d at 959 (quoting Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 337-38
(3d Cir. 2009)).
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health and safety.   199
Courts have found field preemption to be largely inapplicable in the food
labeling context because “[i]t does not appear that Congress has regulated so
comprehensively in either the food and beverage or juice fields that there is no
role for the states.”  Both conflict and express preemption, however, present a200
closer question when they are raised as defenses to state law claims challenging
food labels.  The NLEA preemption cases present a mixed bag of results, but201
they can be broken down into four areas. First, in areas where the FDA has
clearly set forth a labeling standard and the manufacturer is in compliance with
that standard, courts will likely find the state law claim barred by the preemption
doctrine because it seeks to impose obligations “different” or “in addition to”
those standards set forth by the FDA.  Second, in areas where the FDA has202
clearly set forth a labeling standard and the manufacturer is not in compliance
with the standard, courts generally find that the state law claim is not preempted
because the plaintiff is seeking to enforce requirements identical to those set
forth by the FDA.  Third, in areas where the FDA has not clearly articulated a203
labeling standard, courts generally find that the state law claim is not
preempted.  For example, the preemption argument has been largely204
unsuccessful when asserted in opposition to state law claims challenging foods
labeled “natural.”  To date, the FDA has not defined the term “natural” or205
199. Holk, 575 F.3d at 334 (“Health and safety issues have traditionally fallen within the
province of state regulation. This is true of the regulation of food and beverage labeling and
branding.”). 
200. Id. at 337.
201. See Winters, supra note 8, at 834.
202. See, e.g., Pratt v. Whole Foods Mkt. Cal., Inc., No. 5:12-CV-05652-EJD, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46409, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (“Courts in this district have generally found
express preemption under the FDCA only when: (1) the FDA requirements with respect to a
particular food label or package are clear; and (2) the product label or package at issue is in
compliance with that policy, such that plaintiff necessarily seeks to enforce requirements in excess
of what the FDCA, NLEA, and the implementing regulations require.”). 
203. See, e.g., Ivie v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(“Since California’s Sherman Laws fully adopt federal food labeling law, allowing plaintiff’s state
law UCL claims to proceed based on the ‘unlawfulness’ of the nut mix label imposes no other
requirement than what FDA regulations already require . . . for the purposes of preemption,
plaintiff’s claim is not expressly preempted and cannot be dismissed on that basis.”). 
204. See Colby Ctr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-05248, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89711, at *9-10 (W.D. Ark. July 6, 2015) (“The Court must consider whether the requirements
Center seeks to impose in his state-law action are identical to the requirements in the NLEA. While
§ 343-1 lists specific instances where labeling is preempted, allegations regarding ‘all natural’ do
not fall under these categories. The parties do not cite to, and the Court does not find, any
regulation of the use of ‘natural’ on a food label. A finding of express preemption requires explicit
statutory language preempting Center's claims. Thus, with respect to Center's claims . . . there are
no federal requirements regarding the term ‘natural’ to be given preemptive effect.”).
205. Nicole E. Negowetti, Defining Natural Foods: The Search for a Natural Law, 26 REGENT
288 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:267
issued regulations regarding when use of this term is appropriate.  Thus, state206
law claims challenging “natural” representations are not inconsistent with
existing FDA rules and are therefore not preempted.   207
The fourth category of NLEA preemption cases is the most vexing. The
preemption argument becomes a close call where the FDA has issued pertinent
guidance or relevant rules, but arguably no regulation that is directly on point to
the misrepresentation at issue.  The Benecol cases fall within this category.208 209
In the 2015 Ninth Circuit opinion of Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, the plaintiff
sued the manufacturer of Benecol, a vegetable oil-based spread.  Benecol’s210
label proclaimed that it contained “No Trans Fat.”  Benecol did, in fact, contain211
a very small amount of trans-fat.  The plaintiff alleged that these claims were212
not authorized by the FDA.  Although the FDA expressly allows manufacturers213
to use the terms “No Fat” and “No Saturated Fat” when their products contain
less than .5 grams of fat per serving, the FDA has not expressly authorized a
claim of “No Trans Fat” where the product contains less than .5 grams of trans-
fat.  The court concluded that the “No Trans Fat” claim had not been authorized214
by the FDA; accordingly, the plaintiff’s state law claim challenging the truth of
that representation was not preempted.  Benecol’s label also claimed that it215
contained plant stanol esters, which can lower cholesterol.  The FDA did216
expressly authorize a health claim regarding plant stanol esters and the reduced
risk of high cholesterol.  The manufacturer conceded that its representations217
regarding plant stanol esters did not conform to the FDA’s authorized health
claim regulation.  It argued, however, that its representations did conform to an218
FDA letter setting forth the agency’s enforcement intentions with regard to plant
stanol esters health claims.  The manufacturer argued that this FDA letter219
“created [a] federal policy preempting state law.”  The court declined to give220
U. L. REV. 329, 334-35 (2014).
206. Id. at 343.
207. Id. at 334-35.
208. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that
in the absence of a formal definition of the term “natural,” the FDA’s policy statement regarding
the term was not entitled to preclusive effect). 
209. See generally Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2015); Young v.
Johnson & Johnson, No. 12-2475, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9422 (3d Cir. May 9, 2013).
210. Reid, 780 F.3d at 956.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 957. 
213. Id.
214. Id. at 962.
215. Id. at 963.
216. Id. at 956.
217. Id. at 963.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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the letter preemptive effect because nothing indicated that the letter had the force
of law and “the letter’s plain language [did] not authorize any health claims that
conflict[ed] with the FDA’s existing plant stanol esters rule.”  Thus, the court221
found that the preemption doctrine did not bar the plaintiff’s plant stanol esters
claim.   222
The opposite result was reached in an unpublished 2013 Third Circuit
opinion addressing the same product and same claims regarding Benecol’s trans-
fat and plant stanol esters representations.  In Young v. Johnson & Johnson, the223
court interpreted the FDA’s nutrient content claim regulations to allow a claim
of “No Trans Fat.”  Similarly, the court concluded that Benecol’s health claims224
based on the presence of plant stanol esters were permitted under FDA
regulations.  Benecol’s representations were not misleading because they were225
authorized by the FDA; thus, the plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted
because they sought “to impose standards that are not identical to those set forth
in the regulations.”226
Preemption under the NLEA continues to be a contentious, confusing, and
time-consuming issue that ties up litigants and the lower courts for a considerable
portion of these cases. It is not the only defense raised to combat private
litigation targeted at misleading food labels, however. As discussed below,
defendants often assert the primary jurisdiction defense in concert with
preemption or preclusion.227
3. Primary Jurisdiction.—Like preclusion and preemption, the primary
jurisdiction doctrine bears on the relationship between agency enforcement and
private litigation. The doctrine has been invoked in cases that involve both
federal and state law claims targeted at areas regulated by the FDA.  It is228
confusingly titled, as its invocation does not require a court to dismiss a case
because it lacks jurisdiction to hear the dispute; rather, it has been characterized
as a prudential doctrine where the court, in its discretion, stays the dispute
pending guidance from the agency with “primary jurisdiction” and expertise in
the area: 
The primary jurisdiction doctrine allows courts to stay proceedings or to
dismiss a complaint without prejudice pending the resolution of an issue
within the special competence of an administrative agency. A court’s
221. Id. at 964-65.
222. Id. at 966.
223. Young v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 12-2475, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9422 (3d Cir. May
9, 2013).
224. Id. at *8-9.
225. Id. at *9.
226. Id. at *14.
227. See, e.g., JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
228. See, e.g., id. at 1001 (discussing the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the context of
Lanham Act claims challenging food labels); Ivie v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1033,
1045 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (discussing the primary jurisdiction doctrine in context of state law claims
challenging food labels). 
290 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:267
invocation of the doctrine does not indicate that it lacks jurisdiction.
Rather, the doctrine is a “prudential” one, under which a court
determines that an otherwise cognizable claim implicates technical and
policy questions that should be addressed in the first instance by the
agency with regulatory authority over the relevant industry rather than
by the judicial branch.229
Not every issue that touches on an area subject to federal regulation should be
stayed pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine, however. The doctrine
should be invoked sparingly and applied only to those especially complex issues
of agency regulation or issues of first impression.  The purpose of the primary230
jurisdiction doctrine is to encourage efficiency in decision-making.  Courts231
typically consider four factors in determining whether to apply the primary
jurisdiction doctrine: “‘(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed
by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory
authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in
administration.’”  The courts’ treatment of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in232
the context of FDA-regulated products has been inconsistent, but a few patterns
in application of the doctrine appear to be emerging.
First, courts are more likely to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine where
it appears that the FDA will come forward with a relevant rule in the near
future.  Conversely, it will not be invoked where it appears that the FDA233
intends to remain silent on the issue.  Simple agency interest in the subject234
matter of the lawsuit is an insufficient basis for invoking the primary jurisdiction
doctrine.  In recent years, for example, a rash of cases have been filed235
229. Dean v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. EDCV 15-0107, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80150, at
*6-7 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (citations omitted). 
230. Id. at *11-12.
231. Zakaria v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. LA CV-15-00200, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80428, at
*15 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2015).
232. JHP Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1001 (quoting United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 828
F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1987)).   
233. See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
the lower court did not err in applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine in a cosmetics labeling case
because there were indications that the FDA would issue guidance on the topic in the near future);
Gisvold v. Merck & Co., 62 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1204 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (applying the primary
jurisdiction doctrine where an FDA-proposed rule was pending in notice and comment phase).
234. See, e.g., Gedalia v. Whole Foods Mkt. Servs., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 943, 950 (S.D. Tex.
2014) (“Here, deference to the FDA would likely be unfruitful due to the agency’s long-standing
reluctance to officially define the term ‘natural.’”). 
235. See, e.g., Dean v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. EDCV 15-0107, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80150, at *16 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (finding that the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not bar
plaintiff’s claims simply because the FTC had launched an investigation into the defendant’s
conduct).  
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challenging food products alleged to be misbranded as “natural.”  Some of236
these actions were stayed pending FDA guidance on the definition of the term
“natural.”  Given the fact that food labeling falls squarely within the237
jurisdiction of the FDA, these courts concluded that it would be more efficient,
and lead to more consistent results, if the cases were stayed until the FDA spoke
on the matter.  Other courts suspected that referring their cases to the FDA238
would be pointless because repeated calls to the FDA for a definition of the word
“natural” had gone unanswered.  In 2014, the FDA, citing resource constraints,239
declined to issue a rule on the meaning of the term “natural.”  Accordingly,240
courts facing similar “natural” claims today have declined to invoke the primary
jurisdiction doctrine because it appears unlikely that the FDA will answer the
“natural” question anytime soon.  A similar rationale was applied in the food241
health claim context by the Ninth Circuit in the 2015 case of Reid v. Johnson &
Johnson.  In that case, the plaintiff alleged that Benecol’s representations242
regarding trans-fat and plant stanol esters were misleading.  The defendant243
urged the court to refer the claims to the FDA pursuant to the primary
jurisdiction doctrine; however, the court found no indication that the FDA was
likely to issue new rules regarding trans-fat or plant stanol esters in the near
future.  Thus, application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was244
inappropriate.  245
Second, courts are unlikely to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine where
the issue presented is not one that requires agency expertise, such as lawsuits
alleging straightforward issues of product misrepresentation. For example, the
236. See Negowetti, supra note 205, at 332-33.
237. See In re Gen. Mills, Inc., No. CIV-A-12-249 KM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160702, at
*2 (D. N.J. Nov. 1, 2013) (referring the definition of “natural” to the FDA under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine); Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C12-05185 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
118225, at *29 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (referring the definition of “natural” to the FDA pursuant
to the primary jurisdiction doctrine); Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97207, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (staying “natural” case pursuant to the primary
jurisdiction doctrine).
238. See Negowetti, supra note 205, at 340-41.
239. See id. at 338-39 (summarizing decisions that declined to refer the “natural” question to
the FDA); see also Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01480 (JAM),
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40984, at *16 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2015) (“[A]pplication of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine is particularly inappropriate where, as here, the relevant administrative agency
has shown no interest in addressing the matter.”). 
240. See Negowetti, supra note 205, at 343.
241. See, e.g., Gedalia v. Whole Foods Mkt. Servs., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 943, 950 (S.D. Tex.
2014) (refusing to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine in light of the FDA’s repeated refusal to
provide guidance on the meaning of the term “natural”). 
242. 780 F.3d 952, 967 (9th Cir. 2015).
243. Id. at 957. 
244. Id. at 967. 
245. Id.
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Reid court determined that it was well-able to rule on the merits of the plaintiff’s
claims, which primarily involved allegations of consumer fraud: “The issue that
this case ultimately turns on is whether a reasonable consumer would be misled
by [defendant’s] marketing, which the district courts have reasonably concluded
they are competent to address in similar cases.”  Likewise, courts are reluctant246
to apply primary jurisdiction where the plaintiff’s claims involve simple
misrepresentations of FDA approval. For instance, in Zakaria v. Gerber Products
Co., the district court declined to stay the case pursuant to the primary
jurisdiction doctrine where the crux of the plaintiff’s claim was that Gerber
overstated FDA approval of qualified health claims in connection with labels and
advertisements for its infant formula.  The plaintiff alleged violations of various247
California consumer protection statutes and also asserted state law tort claims
such as fraud and breach of warranty.  Gerber argued that the primary248
jurisdiction doctrine required the court to refrain from hearing the case since its
qualified health claims were regulated by the FDA.  The court noted that the249
primary jurisdiction doctrine should only be applied in complex matters that
Congress has clearly placed within the hands of an administrative agency.  The250
court declined to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine in Zakaria, finding that
there was nothing particularly complex about the task of evaluating whether
Gerber’s representations of FDA approval were misleading:  
Plaintiff raises neither an issue of first impression nor a complex one.
Instead, her claims turn on whether Defendant’s representations
concerning the health benefits of Good Start Gentle and the FDA’s
approval of the formula were false or misleading. To be sure in
analyzing Defendant’s health claims, a factfinder may be required to
consider evidence about clinical studies . . . [but] [t]his is not a sufficient
basis to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine.251
Third, courts may apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the lawsuit
involves allegations that the defendant has misrepresented the “safety,”
“effectiveness,” or “legality” of a product. In JHP Pharmaceuticals, LLC v.
246. Id.; see also Garcia v. Kashi Co., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (finding
that allegations of misleading product labels and consumer reliance are not “technical” areas
requiring FDA expertise); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 522, 530 (S.D. Ohio
2011) (declining to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the claims involved allegations
of misrepresentations and consumer reliance); Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d
1111, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (declining to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine where plaintiffs
advanced a straightforward claim of consumer deception, which was an area courts are equipped
to handle).
247. Zakaria v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. LA CV 15-00200 JAK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80428,
at *16 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2015).
248. Id. at *3.
249. Id. at *3-4.
250. Id. at *15.
251. Id. at *17.   
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Hospira, Inc., for example, the plaintiff brought a Lanham Act claim alleging
that the defendant’s marketing of its injectable epinephrine product misled
consumers by, among other things, representing that its products were safe,
effective, and legal.  The court suggested that these claims could be subject to252
the primary jurisdiction doctrine because determinations of a product’s “safety”
and “effectiveness” may fall within the expertise of the FDA.  The court also253
suggested that representations regarding a product’s compliance with applicable
laws—including the FDCA—could be subject to the primary jurisdiction
doctrine because the question of a product’s “legality” under the FDCA is for the
FDA to decide: 
In short, unlike the binary factual determination of whether Defendants’
products are, in fact, FDA-approved, the question of legality directly
implicates the FDA’s rulemaking authority. The determination of
whether a drug is “new,” and whether it can be lawfully marketed under
the FDCA, involves complex issues of history, public safety, and
administrative priorities that Congress has delegated exclusively to the
FDA.254
B. Preclusion, Primary Jurisdiction, and Potential Interagency Conflict
Two of the jurisdictional doctrines discussed above—preclusion and primary
jurisdiction—have implications not only for private actors seeking remedies for
misbranded food products, but also for other agencies seeking to protect the
consuming public.  As noted in Part I.A.3, the FDA and the FTC share255
enforcement authority with regard to representations about a food’s health
benefits.  Historically, the FDA has exercised jurisdiction over food labels,256
while the FTC has exercised jurisdiction over advertisements.  There is not257
always a bright line between labels and advertisements  however, and the258
potential for jurisdictional confusion arises when the FTC takes issue with health
252. JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 996 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
253. Id. at 1003. However, the court concluded that the plaintiff had alleged no facts to suggest
that the defendant’s products were unsafe or ineffective; thus, the court declined to decide whether
any such claims, had they been properly before the court, would have been barred by the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. Id.
254. Id. at 1004.
255. See Masaitis & Woolley, supra note 8 (discussing application of the preclusion and
primary jurisdiction doctrines to a FTC lawsuit challenging manufacturer’s representations about
FDA-regulated qualified health claim).
256. See supra Part I.A.3.
257. See supra Part I.A.
258. See Kim Schmid, Jenny Young & Katherine Fillmore, Gray Zone Between FDA and FTC
Nutraceutical Regulation, L. 360 (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.bowmanandbrooke.com/~/media/
Documents/Insights/News/2013/08/Gray%20Zone%20Between%20FDA%20And%20FTC%20
Nutraceutical%20Regulation.pdf [http://perma.cc/V5Y9-262D] (noting blurred lines with regard
to advertisements and labels in context of nutraceuticals).
294 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:267
claims that have been regulated, at least in part, by the FDA. Such is the case in
the recently filed lawsuit of Federal Trade Commission v. Gerber Products
Co.  Gerber has pleaded the affirmative defenses of preclusion and primary259
jurisdiction, arguing that the FDA is the only agency with authority to address the
disputed health claims.  260
The action, filed in October, 2014 in the District of New Jersey, alleged that
Gerber violated the FTC Act through the “labeling, advertising, marketing,
distribution, and sale” of its infant formula, Gerber Good Start Gentle.  The261
FTC’s complaint challenged representations made in a variety of media:
television commercials, print advertisements, supermarket displays, a gold sticker
affixed to the formula container, and a badge on the formula label.262
Specifically, the complaint alleged that in 2005, Gerber sought FDA health claim
approval for the relationship between the whey protein in its formula and a
reduced risk of food allergies.  The FDA rejected this petition, finding that it263
was not scientifically supported.  Three years later, Gerber sought health claim264
approval based on “emerging clinical results” for the relationship between whey
protein and atopic dermatitis.  The FDA did not authorize the health claim, but265
it did issue a letter permitting Gerber to make the following qualified health
claim: “the relationship between 100% Whey-Protein Partially Hydrolyzed infant
formulas and the reduced risk of atopic dermatitis is uncertain, because there is
little scientific evidence for the relationship.”  Gerber marketed its infant266
formula with a gold badge affixed to the label that read, “1st and Only, Meets
FDA Qualified Health Claim.”  Another sticker affixed to the formula canister267
boasted the relationship between its formula and a reduction in the risk of
allergies: “1st & ONLY Routine Formula TO REDUCE THE RISK OF
DEVELOPING ALLERGIES.”  Based on these facts, the FTC complaint made268
two claims.  First, it alleged that Gerber made false, misleading, or269
unsubstantiated claims based on its express or implied representation that
“feeding Gerber Good Start Gentle formula to infants with a family history of
allergies prevents or reduces the risk that they will develop allergies.”  Second,270
the complaint alleged that Gerber expressly or impliedly represented that its
formula “qualified for or received approval for a health claim” from the FDA,
259. See Complaint, supra note 13.
260. Answer, Gerber Products Co., No. 2:14-cv-06771-SRC-CLW, at 6, 8 (see Gerber’s third
and fourteenth affirmative defenses).
261. Complaint, supra note 13, at 2.
262. Id. at 3-6.
263. Id. at 7.
264. Id. at 7-8. 
265. Id. at 8.
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
269. Id. at 9-10.
270. Id. at 9.
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when, in fact, no such approval was given.   271
The Gerber case provides a vehicle to examine the preclusion and primary
jurisdiction doctrines in the context of the overlapping jurisdiction of the FTC
and the FDA. The FTC is bringing an action involving—at least in part—health
claims on food labels that the FDA has already regulated. As noted in Part I.A.,
regulation of food labels has traditionally fallen to the FDA, while regulation of
food advertising has fallen to the FTC.  The FTC has expressed its willingness272
to defer to the FDA’s conclusions with regard to the scientific substantiation of
health claims and qualified health claims.  Here, the FDA has already evaluated273
Gerber’s scientific evidence, denied approval for an unqualified health claim, and
issued a letter of enforcement discretion with regard to a qualified health
claim.  Thus, to the extent Gerber is playing fast and loose with those274
determinations, it is clear that the FDA has enforcement authority.  
At first blush, it would appear that the FTC is out of bounds and infringing
on the jurisdiction of the FDA. The FTC’s first claim is that Gerber made false,
misleading, or unsubstantiated claims based on its express or implied
representation that “feeding Gerber Good Start Gentle formula to infants with a
family history of allergies prevents or reduces the risk that they will develop
allergies.”  If the FTC’s claim will require the court to reweigh or reevaluate275
the FDA’s findings with regard to the qualified health claim, it is likely that the
court will decline to hear the dispute under either the preclusion or primary
jurisdiction doctrines.  Such a question would require the court to “interpret,276
apply, or enforce the FDCA” —a circumstance that requires application of the277
preclusion doctrine. Such an allegation may require the court to tread on areas
particularly within the FDA’s expertise and may result in a second-guessing of
the FDA’s determinations, thus implicating the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
On the other hand, the FDA’s exercise of regulatory authority does not, as
a matter of course, prevent other agencies from regulating similar conduct.  It278
is clear that the FTC has broad authority to bring actions against advertisers for
unsubstantiated health claims in advertisements  and as illustrated in POM279
Wonderful, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission,  the FTC has authority to280
dictate the type of substantiation required to support such claims. Thus, to the
extent the misrepresentations at issue in Gerber deal with unsupported health
271. Id. at 10.
272. See supra Part I.A.
273. See supra Part I.A.3.
274. Complaint, supra note 13, at 7-8.
275. Id. at 4.
276. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3.
277. Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, No. 14-cv-5852015,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67187, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015).
278. See Childs, supra note 135, at 2413-14 (discussing the FDA and the FTC’s shared
jurisdiction with regard to food labeling and advertising).
279. Id.
280. 777 F.3d 478, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2015).   
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claims in advertisements—particularly those claims that are far afield from the
qualified health claims the FDA evaluated and regulated—the FTC’s authority
to do so is indisputable. Moreover, the more the FTC’s complaint is characterized
as an action based on Gerber’s misrepresentations of the scope of FDA approval
for its health claims, the more likely the case will survive preclusion and primary
jurisdiction challenges.  Indeed, the FTC expressly pleaded such a count in its281
complaint.  Courts have held that a claim based on a misrepresentation of FDA282
approval is not barred by either the preclusion or primary jurisdiction doctrine.283
Questions of the existence of FDA approval are simple enough for the court to
answer, requiring no special agency expertise.  284
Given courts’ recent reluctance to apply the doctrines of preclusion and
primary jurisdiction in the context of food products,  it seems likely that the285
FTC will be allowed to pursue its claims, despite the fact that its claims involve
two areas traditionally within the jurisdiction of the FDA: qualified health claims
and product labels. Regardless, the defendant has pleaded these defenses  and286
if the parties do not settle their dispute, the court will have to answer these
jurisdictional questions. Such a battle will undoubtedly be costly and divert the
FTC’s resources away from the merits of the dispute. As discussed below, a good
deal of time, energy, and expense is wasted on these jurisdictional challenges in
both the private litigation and interagency contexts. Reform is needed.
III. ANALYSIS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As outlined in Part I, representations about a food’s health benefits can be
affected by four overlapping forces: (1) regulation by the FDA of product labels;
(2) enforcement actions by the FTC with regard to advertisements; (3) Lanham
Act claims by competitors; and (4) state law claims by consumers.  The287
convergence of these forces leads to two separate jurisdictional questions. The
first question, discussed in Part III.A, involves the appropriate balance between
federal regulation of health claims and private actions seeking redress for
misleading health claims. The jurisdictional doctrines of preclusion, preemption,
and primary jurisdiction operate as burdensome roadblocks to private
enforcement and they serve only to drain judicial resources and delay resolution
of disputes on the merits. To remedy this problem, the NLEA’s express
preemption provision should be repealed  and the FDCA should be amended to288
allow expressly private actions for violations of the NLEA.  
The second jurisdictional question, discussed in Part III.B, involves the
281. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3.
282. Complaint, supra note 13, at 10.
283. See supra Parts II.A.1; II.A.3.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. Answer, supra note 260, at 6, 8.
287. See supra Part I.
288. See Winters, supra note 8, at 861-62 (concluding that the NLEA is a “failed statute” and
urging the repeal of portions of the NLEA, including its express preemption provision).
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interagency overlap between the FDA and the FTC with regard to food health
claim regulation. Health claims on a product label can overlap with health claims
in an advertisement and the doctrines of preclusion and primary jurisdiction can
be used to bar FTC enforcement actions in this area.  Congress should clarify289
the roles of the two agencies with regard to the regulation of food health claims
to neutralize the effects of the preclusion and primary jurisdiction doctrines.
A. Agency Enforcement Versus Private Litigation
The inefficiencies of the FDA and its inability to regulate food labels
effectively have been well documented by commentators.  Although some290
commentators suggest that the best way to handle the problem is to provide more
funding so that the FDA can do its job better,  others propose a complete291
overhaul of the FDA’s food labeling scheme.  Still others suggest that the FDA292
is so hopelessly broken that it cannot be trusted with such a task: “charging the
FDA with the task of creating and policing a uniform [front of package] labeling
system, when it cannot maintain its current regulatory obligations, seems
unsound.”  Commentators in the latter camp suggest that self-regulation of the293
food industry is the most effective way to prevent consumer deception: “[S]elf-
regulation, which does not solely involve the bureaucracy of government
rulemaking and enforcement, tends to be more efficient, which ultimately
benefits the consumer with lower prices and potentially superior goods or
services.”  As neither additional funding, a comprehensive overhaul of the294
FDA’s labeling system, nor sweeping self-regulation is immediately
forthcoming,  litigation has stepped in to fill the regulatory void left by the295
289. See supra Part II.B.
290. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 5, at 15 (“How does the government ensure compliance
with the laws . . . especially with so many firms and products to oversee? The answer is simple: it
does not. The ratio of enforcement-related activity . . . to the universe of potential enforcement
targets is vanishingly small.”).  
291. See Negowetti, supra note 4, at 22 (“Policing labeling violations is the responsibility of
the FDA, not plaintiffs’ attorneys. To properly fulfill its statutory mission, the FDA will require an
increased budget and the political will to monitor the marketplace.”).  
292. See Pomeranz, supra note 3, at 620 (“Specifically, the FDA needs the authority to seek
civil penalties, prohibit claims proven to be deceptive, and compel companies to turn over their
substantiation documents when new claims are proffered. With increased resources and authority,
the FDA can meet current public health challenges and adequately ensure that labels are clear and
consumers are properly informed and protected.”). 
293. Black, supra note 35, at 13.
294. Id. at 14.
295. See Kathryn E. Hayes, Front-of-Package Nutrition Claims: Trustworthy Facts or
Deceptive Marketing? Closing the Loopholes in Labeling, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 545, 547
(2013) (noting that self-regulation is ineffective because “manufacturers and retailers are more
concerned with their bottom line than the greater public health”); see also Heinzerling, supra note
5, at 22 (“Congress has shown no interest in increasing the funds of the agencies charged with
regulating food; indeed, in the Food Safety Modernization Act passed in 2010, Congress gave FDA
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FDA. 
If the goal is to keep manufacturers honest about their health claims, there is
no doubt that litigation is an effective mechanism for doing so. Even if such suits
are unsuccessful, the litigation costs alone are often sufficient to deter
manufacturer misconduct. Commentators have noted the importance of private
lawsuits in shaping food manufacturers’ behavior  and they suggest that these296
lawsuits act as a complement to self-regulation in the industry.  Food297
manufacturers pay attention to lawsuits and work to avoid them: “to circumvent
litigation, consumer satisfaction and careful attention to labeling continues to be
the top priority.”   Nothing gets a manufacturer’s attention faster than a Lanham298
Act suit from a competitor or a consumer class action. As the Supreme Court
noted in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., competitors are often much
more in tune with the advertisements, labels, and marketing strategies of others
in their industry than regulators are.  Thus, businesses are excellent at sniffing299
out the misrepresentations of their competitors and they are well positioned to
call out those manufacturers who step out of bounds. In addition, they have an
incentive to pursue these claims that the FDA does not—the prospect of gaining
competitive advantage. A plaintiff in a Lanham Act suit can obtain injunctive
relief and damages for the commercial loss suffered as a result of the defendant’s
misrepresentation.    300
Likewise, consumers are well positioned to bring actions challenging
misleading health claims. As the end users of a product, they are the ones who
have shelled out good money for a product that makes promises, and they are the
ones harmed when that product does not deliver. Again, consumers have
incentives to pursue these claims that the FDA lacks—money damages for the
lost benefit of the bargain. Moreover, there is a benefit to having food labeling
issues decided at the local level rather than the federal level. As Indiana
University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Professor Diana Winters noted,
“state law, both positive enactments and common law requirements, can be
tailored in response to the interests of the state’s populace . . . Public
an enormous set of new responsibilities without providing any appreciable new funding to meet
them.”). 
296. See Thompson, supra note 130, at 895 (“Class action lawsuits are currently, in the
absence of an FDA rule, the best solution to define ‘natural’ and protect consumers against
misleading ‘natural’ claims.”); see also Andre, supra note 190, at 252 (“Thus, even though the
NLEA is focused on protecting the consumer, it recognizes that it cannot do so in a comprehensive
manner and that states should be allowed to fill in the gaps only if they so desire. Supporters of
narrow preemption argue that instead of viewing state lawsuits as a burden on manufacturers, it
should be framed as allowing states to provide their citizens with the ability to redress their harm.”). 
297. See Negowetti, supra note 205, at 356. (“The threat of a class action lawsuit or dilution
of the [natural] term’s impact on consumers could prompt food producers or retailers to create a
uniform standard for the industry.”). 
298. Black, supra note 35, at 26. 
299. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014).
300. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1117 (2012).
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participation in shaping [food] policy may be more prevalent in the enactment of
state law than in federal regulation.”301
If private litigation is an effective way to fill the regulatory void left by lax
FDA enforcement, then the jurisdictional doctrines of preclusion, preemption,
and primary jurisdiction need to get out of the way. It is clear that these defenses
are losing steam after the Supreme Court’s decision in POM Wonderful LLC v.
Coca-Cola Co.; they will continue to be an uphill battle for defendants.  Courts302
recognize the inability of the FDA to police food health claims and they are
taking matters into their own hands.  Thus, the trend is to allow more lawsuits303
to proceed rather than fewer. This trend, however, will likely not prevent
manufacturers from asserting these defenses and using valuable court and party
resources, thereby delaying judgment on the merits.  304
Congress should recognize this trend and act accordingly.  Repealing the305
NLEA’s express preemption provision would limit the manufacturer’s ability to
plead the preemption defense except in those truly meritorious circumstances of
conflict preemption (i.e., where it is impossible for the manufacturer to comply
with both the federal and the state requirements), thereby allowing courts and
parties to spend more time on the merits of consumer claims. Such an act would
preserve the federal government’s ability to set the NLEA’s regulations as the
floor of acceptable manufacturer conduct, but it would also allow states to
impose additional health claim labeling requirements where appropriate to
protect consumers.  
In addition, the NLEA should be amended to provide consumers with a
private right of action for violation of its labeling requirements.  Such an action306
would allow consumers who reside in states without robust consumer protection
laws to have a direct route to challenge health claims that violate the NLEA.
Allowing a private right of action under the NLEA would also do much to take
the defenses of preclusion and primary jurisdiction out of play in Lanham Act
suits. In the wake of POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,  food307
301. Winters, supra note 8, at 860.
302. See supra Part II.
303. See generally Winters, supra note 8.
304. See id. at 848 (“Food manufacturer defendants in food labeling cases brought under state
law almost always argue that these suits should not go forward because these issues are covered
under federal law.”). 
305. Id. at 861. Winters suggested that the NLEA’s express preemption provision and its
provisions regarding health and nutrient content claims should be scrapped altogether, thus
effectively allowing state law to define the contours of food health claim regulation. Id. She argued
that the “NLEA’s confusing mandates—resulting in inconsistent judicial decisions on whether or
not the Act preempts actions under state law—have negatively impacted the potential for actions
under state law to affect the food labeling landscape.” Id. at 836.
306. See Heinzerling, supra note 5, at 23. (“Congress should authorize citizen suits for
violations of the federal laws aimed at ensuring the integrity of verbal representations about our
food.”). 
307. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).  
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manufacturers in future Lanham Act cases will undoubtedly invoke the
preclusion doctrine after distinguishing the facts of the POM Wonderful decision
and arguing that the allegations in the lawsuit sub judice are simply
masquerading as attempts to “interpret, apply, or enforce the FDCA.”308
Expressly allowing a private cause of action under the NLEA would eliminate
this argument, thus allowing Lanham Act claims to proceed on the merits. 
The downside of eliminating the NLEA’s preemption provision and
expressly allowing private enforcement of FDA labeling regulations is that
manufacturers could be subject to inconsistent regulation.  Courts in different309
jurisdictions could have varying interpretations of the NLEA,  food labels could310
be subject to additional regulations beyond NLEA’s mandates in different states.
Although this appears to be a significant hurdle, it is no different than a myriad
of other legal risks a nationwide manufacturer faces with regard to many aspects
of its business. For instance, the legal standards involved in the resolution of tort
claims vary from state to state—some states follow comparative fault; others
follow contributory negligence.  States have different formulations for the311
determination of a design defect in product liability cases.  In addition,312
employment laws differ from state to state; employers must comply with these
state laws as well as federal requirements.  Title VII, for example, does not313
contain an express preemption provision; rather it contains a savings clause that
allows states to impose more stringent anti-discrimination regulations than those
required by federal law.  Thus, Title VII sets the floor—not the ceiling—of314
acceptable employer conduct. Manufacturers have found ways to survive and
thrive in the face of potentially inconsistent regulation in these areas; there is no
reason to believe they will be unable to adapt in the food-labeling context.
Another objection to allowing private litigation to augment the NLEA is that
308. Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, No. 14-cv-5852015,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67187, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015).
309. See Winters, supra note 8, at 865-66. Winters discussed this criticism and noted that
manufacturers are already subject to inconsistent results with regard to health claim regulation
because courts are filling in the gaps where the FDA has failed to set forth clear guidelines.
310. See id.
311. See Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning Liability in Maryland
Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L. REV.
701, 707 (2014) (discussing varying approaches to the comparative fault and contributory
negligence doctrines). 
312. See Jason M. Solomon, Juries, Social Norms, and Civil Justice, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1125,
1198 (2014) (discussing the differences between the consumer expectation test and the risk utility
test).
313. See id. at 1200. 
314. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2012) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or
relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future
law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to
require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter.”). 
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the benefit of agency expertise would be lost if NLEA violations were litigated
by private parties in court rather than decided by experts at the FDA. The idea
that the FDA is the only entity qualified to address issues of the scientific
foundation for health claims is largely unfounded.  Courts and juries hear315
disputes daily that require them to evaluate scientific evidence. Toxic tort,
environmental, medical malpractice, and product liability claims all involve large
amounts of expert testimony and complicated scientific issues. Juries handle
complex scientific matters every day; they are equally competent to decide
matters of scientific importance in the context of food. 
As illustrated above, private litigation can fill the regulatory gap left by lax
FDA enforcement of the NLEA. Courts in a post-Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca
Cola Co. world have been reluctant to apply the doctrines of preclusion,
preemption, and primary jurisdiction to bar private litigation, but these doctrines
continue to be asserted and vigorously litigated by defendants.  To allow courts316
to spend more time on the merits and less time on burdensome jurisdictional
motion practice, the NLEA’s express preemption provision should be repealed
and consumers should have a private right of action to enforce the FDA’s food
health claim regulations. These measures would lessen the impact of the
jurisdictional doctrines discussed herein and expressly recognize the roles of the
competitor and the consumer in shaping food-labeling policy. 
B. Resolution of Interagency Jurisdictional Issues
Not only have jurisdictional doctrines been raised to foil the attempts of
private litigants who seek redress for misleading health claims, but they have also
been raised in an effort to block enforcement actions by another regulatory
agency, the FTC.  The traditional division of labor between the FTC and the317
FDA with regard to such claims is that the FTC has enforcement authority over
advertisements while the FDA has authority over labels.  But as Federal Trade318
Commission v. Gerber Products Co. illustrates, the line between a label and an
advertisement is not always easy to define, particularly where the FDA has
engaged in some regulatory activity with regard to the health claim at issue.319
Defendants in FTC enforcement actions that address misleading health claims
can thus raise the arguments of preclusion and primary jurisdiction in an effort
to force the case back into the lap of the FDA, an agency that is unlikely to
pursue it.320
Removing the express preemption provision in the NLEA and expressly
315. See Winters, supra note 8, at 859 (“This perception, that the expertise of the FDA in the
matters under its jurisdiction is primary and superior, is long-standing and provides the basis for
judicial deference arguments, as well as the justification for regulation. Here, however, the
perception is wrong.”). 
316. See supra Part II.A.
317. See supra Part II.B.
318. See supra Part I.A.
319. See supra Part II.B.
320. Id.
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allowing a private right of action for NLEA violations would lend support to the
argument that neither the preclusion nor primary jurisdiction doctrine bars the
FTC’s enforcement actions in this context. Such legislative action would
evidence Congress’ intent to open areas traditionally within the FDA’s exclusive
authority to other enforcement mechanisms, including enforcement by another
agency. Regardless, Congress should more clearly define the respective roles of
these agencies with regard to representations about a food’s health benefits. This
action would lessen the impact of costly jurisdictional battles that serve only to
drain the resources of the FTC.   
C. Industry Guidance
Over the past decade, consumers have seen a large increase in the volume
and verbiage of food health claims and this trend does not seem to be going away
at any point in the near future. As a result, companies that want to make food
health claims on their product labels or in advertisements need to consider (1)
how to act in the best interest of their consumers and (2) how to provide reliable
information to consumers while minimizing the risk of litigation. Each of these
issues is discussed below.  
1. Consumer Welfare.—The food and beverage industry should first and
foremost be concerned about the effects of food health claims on consumer
health and decision-making. Prior research on the marketing of foods and
beverages has shown that consumers generally benefit from increased health
information on product packages and in advertisements.  Specifically,321
consumers use the information provided in health claims to make decisions about
what is going to be the healthiest food for themselves as well as their family
members. Consumers use this information to determine what types and quantities
of nutrients are in their food and to understand the effects of these foods on their
health. For example, someone who has diabetes needs to know how many
carbohydrates are in a food product; an individual who has high cholesterol
might want to know how much fat is in a food product. Marketing research also
shows that consumers get confused by excess verbiage in qualified health claims
and might not have the necessary knowledge to be able to interpret the intention
behind the health claim.  Given the fact that consumers rely on these322
321. See generally My Bui et al., Front-of-Package Product Labels: Influences of Varying
Nutritional Food Labels on Parental Decisions, 22 J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 352, 353 (2013);
Lara Spiteri Cornish, It’s Good for Me: It Has Added Fibre! An Exploration of the Role of Different
Categories of Functional Foods in Consumer Diets, 11 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 292, 296 (2012);
Karen Russo France & Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Conveying Level of Science: Tests of Iconic and
Comparative Formats, 20 MKT. LETTERS 385, 395 (2009); John C. Kozup et al., Making Healthful
Food Choices: The Influence of Health Claims and Nutrition Information on Consumers’
Evaluations of Packaged Food Products and Restaurant Menu Items, 67 J. MKT. 19, 25 (2003);
Gail M. Zank & Elyria Kemp, Examining Consumers’ Perceptions of the Health Benefits of
Products with Fiber Claims, 43 J. CONSUMER AFF. 333, 343 (2012).
322. See generally Sophie Heike & Charles R. Taylor, A Critical Review of Literature on
Nutrition Labeling, 46 J. CONSUMER AFF. 120, 133-34 (2012); Jeremy Kees et al., Regulating
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representations to make decisions about what and how much to eat and the fact
that they tend to be confused by complex health claims, the food and beverage
industry should be concerned by how consumers interpret and use such
information. 
2. Implications for the Food and Beverage Industry.—The legal rulings and
regulations discussed in the majority of this Article have a significant effect on
how information can and should be communicated to consumers. The NLEA
mandates that consumers be apprised of the nutritional content of food and
beverages.  In addition, FDA regulations and FTC oversight bear on the way323
health claims should to be worded on a product package and in an
advertisement.  To make all of this as clear as possible to the consumer,324
producers should carefully consider the claims that they make on products labels,
promotions, and advertisements. Food producers making front-of-package claims,
which are regulated primarily by the FDA, should keep the claims relatively
simple. This could be accomplished in two ways, either by making
straightforward nutrient-content claims or by making only those authorized
health claims that have been expressly approved by the FDA. In both cases, the
language associated with the claim is kept to a minimum, which is usually
beneficial for marketers trying to manage the aesthetics of a product package.
Adhering to the FDA-approved language for authorized health claims and
nutrient-content claims will reduce the likelihood of a consumer class action or
an enforcement action by the FTC.  With regard to qualified health claims, the325
FDA requires disclaimers that discuss the scientific certainty of the claim.326
These disclaimers are often lengthy and cannot reasonably fit on a product
label.  Manufacturers should resist the temptation to “summarize” these327
qualifiers in order to fit them onto a product label.  Departing from the FDA’s328
recommended disclaimer language opens the manufacturer to consumer lawsuits
and FTC scrutiny. For example, it is Gerber’s alleged mischaracterization of
FDA approval of its qualified health claim that is the subject of the lawsuit filed
by the FTC.    329
In other sorts of promotional tools, such as advertisements, marketers find
more room to include the disclaiming language of a qualified health claim. As
such, members of the food and beverage industry should consider saving
qualified health claims for their advertising campaigns, where they have space
to include a discussion of the scientific certainty of the claim. Under these
circumstances, manufacturers should use the exact, verbatim language
Front-of-Package Nutrition Information Disclosures: A Test of Industry Self-Regulation vs. Other
Popular Options, 48 J. CONSUMER AFF. 147 (2014). 
323. See supra Part I.A.1.
324. See supra Part I.A.
325. See Masaitis & Woolley, supra note 8.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See supra Part II.B.
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recommended by the FDA in its letter of enforcement discretion.  Consumers330
are accustomed to hearing or reading warning and disclaimer language during
advertisements in a variety of health-related product categories (e.g.,
pharmaceuticals, health behavior change programs and products, etc.);
accordingly, they will likely not be surprised to hear disclaiming language
accompanying health claims in the food and beverage context. In short,
manufacturers can deal fairly with consumers and avoid litigation if they ensure
that the representations about their products conform to FDA guidelines and are
supported by solid scientific research.  331
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the FDA lacks the resources and manpower to monitor every
health claim asserted by every food producer. Although lawsuits filed by
competitors, consumers, and the FTC can lessen the FDA’s burden, the doctrines
of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction create unnecessary
roadblocks to these claims. Parties spend too much time litigating these threshold
jurisdictional questions, time that would be better spent on the merits of the
underlying claims. Congress should remove these barriers to private enforcement
by eliminating the NLEA’s express preemption provision and creating a private
right of action for NLEA violations. In addition, Congress should clarify the roles
of the FTC and the FDA with regard to food health claims. Such a clarification
would answer the jurisdictional objections posed by defendants in FTC
enforcement actions. Finally, manufacturers seeking to avoid litigation and to act
in the best interest of their customers should carefully follow FDA guidelines and
make only those health representations that are supported by solid scientific
evidence.
330. See Masaitis & Woolley, supra note 8.
331. See Berman, supra note 111, at 102 (“[When making] disease-related claims in
advertising, firms should be prepared to show FTC staff that their studies are valid and the results
are legitimate . . . Accordingly, advertisers should keep records relating to studies protocols,
instructions to and communications with participants, statistical analyses of test data, and any
materials relating to sponsorship of their human clinical studies.”). 
